# Security model

> How Nested protects your data: deployment boundary, sign-in and tokens, encryption at rest, secrets, agent isolation, teams, and the audit log.

Section: Platform · Updated: 2026-11-19 · Canonical: https://nested.me/docs/security

## The boundary is your cluster

Every Nested service runs in a Kubernetes cluster you operate, and customer data is stored in the Postgres and object storage there. Some flows still leave the cluster, each because you configured it — the coding agent’s model calls, the built-in assistant’s LLM endpoint (which formula gates also use), and an opt-in external gate resolver. There is no shared multi-tenant production service. See [Architecture](https://nested.me/docs/architecture) for what traffic leaves the cluster and why.

## Sign-in

| Method | Notes |
|---|---|
| **Passkeys** | WebAuthn with discoverable credentials and user verification required. Locked out after 10 failed attempts in 15 minutes. Enabled per install |
| **Google** | Accounts are created on first sign-in only for verified emails on an allowed domain, or with a pending team invitation. Registration is not open to the public |
| **Password** | SRP-6a: the server stores a verifier, never the password. 10 attempts per 15 minutes. In managed installs, a break-glass path only |

### Tokens

- Access tokens are RS256 JWTs that live **15 minutes**. Signing keys are published as a JWKS.
- Refresh tokens live **7 days** and rotate on every use. Reusing a spent refresh token outside a 60-second grace window revokes the whole token family.
- Agents get **task tokens** that last 15 minutes by default and at most 1 hour, with no refresh.

### Nested as an identity provider

Nested is an OpenID Connect provider. Other apps can use **Sign in with Nested** through the authorization code flow with PKCE (S256 only). Public clients show a consent page before access is granted. Dynamic client registration is not supported.

## Authorization

- **Teams.** Data is scoped to a team, with roles owner, admin, and member. A cross-team isolation test suite guards the boundary.
- **Resource access.** Ownership and team rules decide who may view, message, or manage each agent, task, and pack — for people and for non-human callers such as peer agents, schedules, and automations.
- **Task acceptance.** Each agent accepts tasks from **Only me** or **Anyone signed in**, enforced by the task service.
- **Policies.** Operators can attach CEL policies, for example to control who may publish packs.

## Encryption at rest

Each service that stores credentials seals them with **AES-256-GCM** under its own key: connector tokens, cluster credentials, Git source credentials, webhook secrets, bot credentials, notification tokens, and saved website logins. Environments uses envelope encryption with a rotatable key ring. Keys come from your install’s configuration or your Vault through External Secrets; Nested does not integrate with a KMS or HSM.

## Secrets in agents

- You store API keys as [secrets](https://nested.me/docs/secrets), available to **Only me** or **Everyone**. Values are write-only in the app.
- Bound secrets reach the agent pod through a Kubernetes Secret, never inlined into manifests.
- Connector tokens never enter the agent: a loopback proxy adds them to requests.
- Saved website logins are typed by a broker into a browser the agent controls; the agent receives a status, never the password.

> [!WARNING]
> A coding agent with shell access can read environment variables you bind to it. Nested’s environment filter hides common secret patterns from agent processes, but you should still bind only the credentials an agent needs and prefer connectors and site logins, which keep secrets out of the pod.

## Agent isolation

Agent pods request the Sysbox runtime with user namespaces, fall back to Kata Containers, and otherwise use the default runtime. Pods run as an unprivileged user, and coding-agent processes get a deny-by-default environment. See [Agent runtime](https://nested.me/docs/agent-runtime).

## Network exposure

Agents are not reachable from the internet by default; the control plane reaches them through Kubernetes port-forwards. Inbound events from GitHub, Slack, and webhooks are verified before they become tasks; generic webhooks default to HMAC signatures. Team custom connectors cannot target private addresses.

## Audit

Every user action across services is recorded in an audit log: who, what, which resource, field-level changes, request id, IP address, and user agent. The log keeps 90 days by default. You can read your own entries under **Settings → Activity**. Knowledge pages keep their own full version history.

## Questions

### How does Nested encrypt secrets?

Each service seals stored credentials with AES-256-GCM under its own key. Environments uses envelope encryption with a rotatable key ring.

### Does Nested support passkeys?

Yes. People can add passkeys to their profile and sign in with them. Passkeys require user verification.

### Can agents be reached from the internet?

Not by default. The control plane reaches agents through Kubernetes port-forwards, and agents pull their work from the task service.

## Related

- [Architecture](https://nested.me/docs/architecture)
- [Agent runtime](https://nested.me/docs/agent-runtime)
- [Secrets](https://nested.me/docs/secrets)
- [MCP servers and connectors](https://nested.me/docs/mcp-and-connectors)
